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* Labor Law - Arbitration - Dispute Involving Hazardous
Working Conditions Is Within the Scope of Broad Arbitra-
tion Clause of a Collective Bargaining Agreement in Absence
of Forceful Indication of Exclusionary Intent. Gateway Coal
Co. v. United Mine Workers, 94 S. Ct. 629 (1974).
T HE SUPREME COURT, in Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers
of America,' extended its continued development of national labor
policy by applying the "presumption of arbitrability" to labor disputes
concerning safety of employees.
The collapse of a ventilation structure substantially reduced the air
flow into a mine operated 'by the Gateway Coal Co., seriously increasing
the danger of accumulation of dust, flammable gas and possible explosion.
Three assistant foremen, whose duties included checking and recording
the airflow 2 in the mine, made false entries in their logbooks that failed
to disclose the reduced air flow. The three foremen were suspended,
and criminal proceedings were instituted against them. While the
charges remained pending, the Company, after receiving permission from
the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources, reinstated the
foremen. Ruling that the continued presence of the foremen in the mines
constituted a safety hazard, the union struck. Gateway then sought to
arbitrate under the collective bargaining agreement. The Company
invoked jurisdiction of the District Court under Section 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act.3 The District Court determined the issue
arbitrable and thereby enjoined the strike and ordered immediate
arbitration. 4 On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuits
reversed the judgment and vacated the preliminary injunction. The
Supreme Court granted certiorari.6 In reversing the decision of the
Appellate Court the Supreme Court determined that the presumption of
arbitrability formulated by the Steelworkers' Trilogy 7 applies to safety
disputes; the collective bargaining agreement then in force between the
parties imposed a compulsory duty to submit safety disputes to arbitration
and this duty to arbitrate implied a no-strike obligation supporting the
issuance of the injunctive order.
'Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 94 S. Ct. 629 (1974).
2 Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, 30 U.S.C. § 863(d)(1) (1969).
329 U.S.C. § 185 (1970).
4 See Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 94 S. Ct. 629, 634 (1974).
5 Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 466 F.2d 1157 (3d Cir. 1972).
6410 U.S. 593 (1973).
7 United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593
(1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior and Gulf Navigation Co., 363
U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S.
564 (1960).
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The cornerstone of federal labor policy is the achievement of peaceful
resolution of industrial strife through arbitration.8 This emphasis on
arbitration and the continual evolution of federal labor policy has spawned
a presumption of arbitrability for labor disputes: "An order to arbitrate
the particular grievance should not be denied unless it may be said with
positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an
interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. Doubts should be resolved
in favor of coverage." 9 Justification for the formulation of this expansive
body of federal labor law favoring arbitration is grounded upon legislative
mandate; 10 yet the underlying theory of judicial enforcement of collective
bargaining agreements is the principle that the court is merely enforcing
what the parties had previously agreed. As the Court here noted, obligation
to arbitrate a particular dispute does not arise solely by operation of law
as "the law compels a party to submit to arbitration only if he has
contracted to do so." 11 Judicial inquiry in arbitrability cases must therefore
be strictly confined to the question of whether or not the parties did in
fact agree to arbitrate the grievance. 12 The threshold question then is that
of arbitrability-was it agreed, either explicitly or implicitly that the issue
in dispute 'be submitted to arbitration? In the absence of any express
exclusion or forceful evidence that an exclusion was intended, all doubts
as to arbitrability should be resolved in favor of arbitration.13
Obviously, arbitration of disputes concerning the collective bargain-
ing agreement is not only widely accepted, but as a practical matter,
provides an advantageous and workable method of settling labor disputes.
As such, the collective bargaining agreement itself is not limited by the
substantive law of contracts' 4 and the Court in the instant case agreed
with this basic premise by recognizing the existent flaw in the collective
bargaining agreement, i.e., "[iut cannot define every minute aspect of the
complex and continuing relationship between the parties."' 5 Hence,
the very nature of collective bargaining effectuates an industrial common
law of sorts which is developed through procedures and tribunals specified
by the parties themselves in their basic agreement.
Once the dispute is determined to be arbitrable, there is an implied
aid.
9 Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 94 S. Ct. 629, 637 (1974), quoting United Steelworkers
of America v. Warriors and Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at 582-83.
13Section 203(d) Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1947).
11 Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 94 S. Ct. 629, 635 (1974).
12 United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior and Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574
(1960). See Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U.S. 235, 254 (1970):
"When a strike is sought to be enjoined because it is over a grievance which both
parties are contractually bound to arbitrate, the district court may issue no injunctive
order until it first holds that the contract does have that effect."
13 Id. See also In re General Telephone Company, 53 Lab. Arb. 248 (Morris 1969).
14 See Cox, Current Problems in the Law of Grievance Arbitration, 30 RocKy MT. L.
REv. 247, 262 (1958).
Is94 S. Ct. at 637.
RECENT CASESSpring, 1974]
2
Akron Law Review, Vol. 7 [1974], Iss. 3, Art. 12
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol7/iss3/12
AKRON LAW REVIEW
agreement not to strike16 which is enforceable by a federal court
injunction 17 because of the close relationship between the duty to
arbitrate and the duty not to strike.' 8
The threshold question is twofold: (1) did the collective bargaining
agreement in question impose on the parties a duty to submit matters
of health and safety to arbitration and (2) does the "presumption of
arbitrability" apply to safety disputes?
The focal point is determining the intent of the parties in applying
the grievance provision of the collective bargaining agreement.'9 The
National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1968 provides for
resolution of grievances by direct negotiation between the parties and
ultimately for arbitration by a mutually agreed upon umpire.20 In addition,
it provides for arbitration as to the meaning and application of the
contract. The very fact that the agreement so provides suggests that
the parties recognize the impossibility of foreseeing and providing for all
questions which may arise during the time span of the agreement." It can
therefore be argued, and the Court's reasoning suggests, that a clause
which empowers an arbitrator to interpret and apply the provisions of the
agreement authorizes him to decide questions of arbitrability, which
require interpretation and application of the arbitration clause.22 Since
the collective bargaining agreement is less complete and more loosely
drawn than most other contracts it may also 'be argued that it is necessary
to supply terms from the context in which it was negotiated, i.e., the
principles, assumptions, understandings and aspirations of the on-going
mining operation."
Mr. Justice Powell circumvented this type of analysis by considering
the arbitration provision on its face. The clause was sufficiently broad, it
16 Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
17 Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, 98 U.S. 235 (1970).
18 Id. at 247-249; Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 104, 106 (1962).
19 The Court of Appeals seemingly by-passed this orderly procedure and apparentlyproceeded to attack the presumption of arbitrability: "[A] Court [should] reject any
avoidable construction of a labor contract as requiring final disposition of safetydisputes by arbitration." 466 F.2d at 1160.
20The pertinent clause in the agreement provides: "Should differences arise ... as to
the meaning and application of the provisions of this agreement, or should differences
arise about matters not specifically mentioned in this agreement, or should any localtrouble arise ... [Bie referred to an umpire to be mutually agreed upon ... " This
clause is strikingly similar to the broad clause involved in United Steelworkers ofAmerica v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960), which the Court interpreted asintent to arbitrate.
21 NLRB v. Highland Park Mfg. Co., 110 F.2d 632 (4th Cir. 1940); See also Loew's,
Inc., 10 Lab. Arb. 227 (Aaron 1948); Yale and Towne Mfg. Co., 5 Lab. Arb. 753(Raphael 1946).
22Note, 74 HAuv. L. REv. 175 (1960); See generally 49 GEo. L.J. 373 (1960); 46
CORNELL L.Q. 336 (1960).
23 Cox, Reflections Upon Labor Arbitration, 72 HARV. L. REV, 1482 (1959).
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excepted from arbitration only those disputes "national in character, 24
and the dispute here was local in nature therefore the agreement requires
submission to arbitration. 25 Yet, the "Mine Safety Committee" provision
of the agreement, 26 while not an express exception to the arbitration
clause, at least creates an ambiguity as to the intention of the parties
which should reasonably anticipate a process of contractual interpretation.
Reference to custom and practices of the mining industry in general may
have indicated the intended meaning of this provision, and since this same
agreement has been entered into by the United Mine Workers and many
other mining companies, the custom and practice of any of these parties
operating under the agreement may be taken as some indication of the
intended meaning of this provision.Y The Court dismissed this process
by stating that circumvention of the formalized procedures established
for implementation of that provision 28 created a disagreement as to
the meaning and application of the agreement thereby committing it to
resolution through arbitration.
Having examined the agreement, without finding any forceful
indication of exclusionary intent, the Court was then faced with the
proposition of the Court of Appeals that the presumption of arbitrability
is inapplicable to issues of health and safety. In formulating such an
idea, that Court, while paying lip service to the established federal policy
in favor of arbitration, distinguished wages, hours, seniority and other
economic matters from safety disputes.2 9 Through this assumption of
isolation, that Court reasoned such circumstances are sui generis and
exempt from the presumption, 30 therefore declaring a presumption of
non-arbitrability in the area of safety. In so holding, the majority of the
Court of Appeals apparently assumed that safety disputes are rarely
arbitrated or that employees would never agree to submit safety disputes
to arbitration. This is simply not so.a' Yet, both the Court of Appeals and
2494 S. Ct. at 636.
25Paragraph three of the agreement provides: "[A]U disputes and claims which are
not settled by agreement shall be settled by the machinery provided in the 'Settlement
of Local and District Disputes' section of this agreement unless national in character
..." 94 S. Ct. at 635 n.7.
26 The mine safety provision established a committee empowered to close the mines if
it believed there was imminent danger. The management could request that the
arbitrator remove members of the committee if they believe the action of
the committee arbitrary, but the arbitrator was not given the power to review the
recommendation that the mine be closed.
27E. W. Bliss Co., 53 Lab. Arb. 725 (McDermott 1969); American Machine and
Foundry Co., 48 Lab. Arb. 1011 (Geissinger 1967); Lake Mining Co., 20 Lab. Arb.
297 (Marshall 1953); Smith Display Service, 17 Lab. Arb. 524 (Sherbow 1951).
28 The committee itself did not actually decide that a danger existed. Rather the local
membership vote to strike was construed by the Court of Appeals to constitute
substantial compliance with the provision. Mr. Justice Powell felt that as a matter of
simple contractual interpretation, such contention was unacceptable. 94 S. Ct. at 640.
29 466 F.2d at 1160.
30 Id.
31 Mr. Justice Douglas has also accepted this assumption in his dissent "[Mien are
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Mr. Justice Douglas were obviously influenced by the very hazardous
nature of coal mining.3 2 They felt that issues of safety add a new
dimension to established principles of arbitration; i.e., where life is at
stake, those directly affected by hazardous conditions should be given
greater latitude in seeking a remedy to eliminate those hazards.
Mr. Justice Powell neither considered nor reflected upon the safety
of employees which so troubled the dissent. Rather, he leaped to the
conclusion that the presumption of arbitrability is as applicable to disputes
touching the safety of employees as to other varieties of disagreement. 3
The major emphasis implicit in this conclusion is not necessarily the
importance of individual safety but the avoidance of industrial strife and
the resultant lost pay, curtailment of production and economic instability.34
In this balancing of interests, the employees lose. Although the
preservation of life and protection from injury are surely goals which
maintain a lofty position in our social order, many commentators maintain
that a weighing of the costs and benefits is necessarily involved in
improving safety. Elimination of risk at all cost is not only unrealistic
but economically unfeasible.3
The dissent also relies (as did the Court of Appeals) on section
502 of the Labor Management Relations Act 36 in formulation of this
novel presumption of non-arbitrability. The Court rebutted this argument
by simply noting that to the extent section 502 might be relevant to the
issue of arbitrability, the considerations favoring arbitrability outweigh
the ambiguous impact of this section.37 The Court should have looked to
more specific authority to support its conclusion. Since section 502 and
section 301 are part of the same chapter of the LMRA they were read in
not wont to submit matters of life and death to arbitration ... " 94 S. Ct. at 644. For
reported arbitration decisions on safety issues see A. G. Suitor Construction Co., 52
Lab. Arb. 599 (Jones 1969); American Oil Co., 51 Lab. Arb. 484 (Barnhart 1968);
Fruehauf Trailer Corp., 48 Lab. Arb. 1291 (Kallenbach 1967). Compare the agree-
ment between Chrysler Corp. and UAW containing an express limitation on the
arbitration procedure concerning health and safety. This limitation forcefully implies
that matters of health and safety are strikeable issues even in the presence of a
no-strike provision. Memorandum of Understanding-Health and Safety, at 193, with
the basic agreement between the USW and the major steel companies containing a
contra provision, specifically providing for arbitration of safety disputes, § 14(c).
32 Bureau of Labor Statistics, Handbook of Labor Statistics 362, 363 (1972); Bureau
of Labor Statistics Report No. 406, Injury Rates by Industry 1970, 3, 4, 6 (1972).
For a discussion of the influence of mining hazards on the Court of Appeals decision,
see 41 CrN. L. Rav. 943 (1972).
33 94 S. Ct. at 638.
34 Id.
35 See Wheeler and Snow, Proposals for Administrative Action Under the Federal
Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, 3 NAT. REs. Rav. 248, 253 (1970). For adiscussion of acceptable risks and rules of law see Coase, The Problem of Social
Cost, 3 J. LAW & ECON. 1 (1960).
36 Section 502 of Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 143 (1947) provides:
"[Nlor shall the quitting of labor by an employee or employees in good faith because
of an abnormally dangerous conditions... be deemed a strike .... "
37 94 S. Ct. at 636 n.8.
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pari materia by the Court of Appeals. The Court should have realized
that although this reasoning is rational, the Court of Appeals conveniently
omitted accommodation of section 203(d) 38 in its reading of the LMRA.
Accommodation at this point would have been logically appropriate.39 In
circuitously skirting the issue, the Court considered section 502 on its face
and felt that it related more directly to the scope of a no-strike obligation
than on the arbitrability of safety disputes. This evasive procedure failed
to recognize the obvious analogy between a finding that a walkout under
section 502 is not a strike and therefore not within the arbitration
provision of the collective bargaining agreement.
Developing an accommodation procedure would lead to a considera-
tion of other legislative enactments dealing specifically with industrial
safety-The Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 196940 and The
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970.41 These enactments
contemplate a joint Labor-Management effort to reduce 'health and safety
hazards. 42 They empower federal inspectors, upon request of employees or
their representatives, to make independent third-party determinations as
to the existence and severity of the alleged safety hazards and demand
removal of the employees in the event he feels such danger is imminent. 43
If an inspector advises an employer that such condition is existent, a
restraining order would be obtained shutting down the entire operation
or at least that portion which endangers the physical safety of the
employees.4 4 It is precisely this type of independent determination as to
the existence of a safety hazard that would have been accomplished
through the arbitration procedure established by the parties in the
collective bargaining agreement. Assuming that the safety issue in dispute
is not arbitrable, the employer could not force the union to arbitrate
rather than resort to a walkout testing the economic power of the parties.
It would conversely mean that the union could not compel the company
to arbitrate a similar issue, and if the union has neither the desire nor the
economic ability for a prolonged work stoppage, it may well leave
the employees devoid of an effective method to protect against such safety
hazards. 45 In the latter situation, the protection afforded by federal
38 See text accompanying note 10, supra.
39 Boys Market, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U.S. 235 (1970), accommodating
§ 4 of Norris-La Guardia Act and § 301 of LMRA; Brotherhood of Railroad Train-
men v. Chicago River and Indiana R.R. Co., 353 U.S. 30 (1957), accommodating
Norris-LaGuardia Act and Railway Labor Act.
40 30 U.S.C. § 801 et. seq. (1969).
4129 U.S.C. § 651 et. seq. (1970).
42 See The Occupational Safety and Health Act. of 1970 § 2(b) (1); Federal Coal
Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 § 2(e); [hereinafter cited as OHSHA and
FCMHSA respectively].
43 FCMHSA § 103, 104; OSHA §§ 8, 9, 10, 11, 13.
44OSHA § 13(c); See generally Spann, The New Occupational Safety and Health
Act, 58 A.B.A.J. 255 (1972).
4 5 See Brief for the petitioner at 26-28.
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legislation may necessarily be the sole method to implement corrective
measures. Thus, contrary to Mr. Justice Douglas' interpretation, the
intent of Congress as expressed in the Labor Management Relations
Act, OSHA, and the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act, that
disputes be resolved by peaceful means, is clearly consistent with and
an amplification of the Court's expansive notions encompassing the
presumption of arbitrability.46
Despite the absence of an express no-strike clause in the collective
bargaining agreement, injunctive relief may be granted on the basis of an
implied understanding not to strike.47 Although the Court realized that
such an implied understanding must be ascertained by analyzing the intent
of the parties, absent an explicit expression of non-inclusion, intent could
be found by the inclusion of the arbitration provision: "A no-strike
obligation, express or implied is the quid pro quo for an understanding by
the employer to submit disputes to the process of arbitration."'
Such reasoning is obviously influenced by the fear that inability to
enjoin the dispute, which in effect is the breach of a no-strike provision,
would have a devastating impact on the stability of labor relations.49
Thus is evidenced the continual emphasis on peaceful resolution of
industrial strife by expansion of the presumption of arbitrability to cover
disputes relating to the health and safety of employees. Such expansion is
consistent with the congressional intent embodied in the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act. If disputes touching upon safety of employees are to
be resolved on the picket line, the result would necessarily rest upon the
relative economic strength of the parties. If the resources of the parties
are unequal there is no assurance that the ultimate resolution of the
conflict will in any way reflect the socially desirable result of insuring
the safety of those employees. Hence, the Court's emphasis on the federal
labor policy favoring peaceful resolution of disputes, here, those concern-
ing safety. Yet, this is not to suggest that all such disputes will be so
peacefully resolved. The holding in this case can reasonably be expected
to be circumvented by negotiators armed with specific contractual provi-
sions excluding issues of health and safety from the arbitration procedure.
In the future we can therefore anticipate that disputes like that of the
46 Id. at 21-24.
47 Since the decision in Lucas Flour lower courts have consistently implied an agree-
ment not to strike over arbitrable disputes. Old Ben Coal Corp. v. Mine Workers,
457 F.2d 162 (7th Cir. 1972); Blue Diamond Coal Co. v. Mine Workers, 436 F.2d
551 (6th Cir. 1970); United States Steel Corp. v. Mine Workers, 320 F. Supp. 743
(W.D. Pa. 1970). But see United Mine Workers v. NLRB, 257 F.2d 211 (D.C. Cir.
1958), where the court did not agree that a contract provision which should be
arbitrated is the same as a binding agreement not to strike. This case was decided
before Lucas Flour.
4894 S. Ct. at 639 quoting Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U.S. 235,
248 (1970).
49 Judge Rosen, in his dissent, discussed this possible effect on labor relations.
514 [Vol. 7:3
7
Royko: Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1974
Spring, 1974] RECENT CASES 515
United Mine Workers may very well be settled on the picket line. Then
the answer by the Court is really no answer at all. To effectuate the goal
of industrial stability, the intent of Congress of peaceful resolution of
labor disputes may indeed be read as to pre-empt the field of safety
from, not as Mr. Justice Douglas would suggest, i.e., arbitrators, but from
inclusion or exclusion in the agreement itself. In such case it would be
negotiators who would receive no share of the power. All such disputes
could then be effectively reconciled with the ultimate legislative and
social goal-the safety of the individual worker.
RAYMOND T. ROYKO
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